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A b s t r a c t
In this paper we extend the vertical linkages model by M arkusen and 
Venables (1999) to  include (a) differing degrees of m ultinational (MNE) 
ownership in their foreign affiliates and (b) knowledge diffusion, in addi­
tion to  dem and and supply linkages. We investigate the intra- and inter­
industry effects of changes in MNE ownership on local firms’ productivity 
via dem and linkages, price effects and knowledge diffusion. Moreover, 
we also consider the m ediating influence of national intellectual property 
rights protection (IPP). Given the ambiguous predictions of our model, 
we also investigate these issues empirically in a panel of 1222 large firms 
spread out over 20 countries and 18 manufacuring industries during the 
period 2000-2005: We find th a t in countries w ith low IPP, the occurence 
of intra-industry productivity effects is conditional on the cost structure 
of local firms. Moreover, inter-industry productivity effects are largely 
absent. Conversely, in countries w ith high IPP, both  intra-industry and 
inter-industry productivity effects are high. Also, the relationship beween 
productivity effects and MNE ownership varies both  w ithin and between 
industries, as well as between conditional and unconditional productivity 
effects. We in terpret this empirical evidence as a confirmation of our the­
oretical conjecture th a t intra-industry knowledge diffusion is dom inated 
by unintended spillovers, whereas inter-industry knowledge diffusion is 
dom inated by intended knowledge transfers.
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1 In tro d u ctio n
In an attem pt to  better disentangle the conditions under which Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) induces knowledge spillovers, academic research has increas­
ingly taken into account the heterogeneity of multinationals (MNEs) and their 
foreign subsidiaries (Feinberg and Keane, 2005; Smeets, 2008). Whereas FDI 
used to  be treated as a rather bulky and homogeneous concept (Lipsey, 2002), 
scholars have started to  acknowledge the heterogeneity of MNEs in inter alia 
investment motives (Girma, 2005; Driffield and Love, 2007), market orientation 
(Girma et al. 2008) and country of origin (Javorcik et al., 2004; Girma and 
Wakelin, 2007), and the subsequent consequences for host-country knowledge 
spillovers.
A particularly promising strand of research has considered differences in 
MNE ownership over foreign aff liates as a determining factor of knowledge 
spillovers (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 2002; Javorcik, 
2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008). Internalization theory suggests th a t in­
creased MNE ownership over a foreign aff liate induces the parent to  transfer 
more proprietary knowledge or technology abroad, thus increasing the potential 
for knowledge diffusion (Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982; Davies, 1992). More­
over, studies on MNE input sourcing suggest th a t increased MNE ownership has 
consequences for the extent of local input sourcing, thus affecting the extent of 
backward linkages (Tavares and Young, 2006; Javorcik, 2008).
Empirical studies usually distinguish minority from majority ownership (Blom- 
ström and Sjöholm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 2004), or shared ownership from 
fully owned subsidiaries (Javorcik, 2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008) and 
indeed find th a t the distinction matters. However, none of these studies consid­
ers the effect of MNE ownership as a continuous variable, which veils a lot of the 
potential variation. Moreover, although some theoretical studies investigate the 
relationship between intra-firm knowledge transfer and MNE ownership (Müller 
and Schnitzer, 2006), theoretical contributions on the relationship between MNE 
ownership and intra and inter-industry knowledge diffusion are largely absent.
This paper first picks up on the latter observation: We introduce shared 
ownership between a MNE and a local (host-country) partner in the foreign 
subsidiary as a variable of interest in a theoretical model by Markusen and 
Venables (1999), and then consider its host-country intra and inter-industry 
effects. Specifically, in addition to  considering only pecuniary externalities, 
as is common in most theoretical models, we also consider actual knowledge 
diffusion. In doing so, the analysis explicitly considers two forms of knowledge 
diffusion: First, knowledge spillovers, which are unintended knowledge flows 
(i.e. externalities) from the MNE to  its host-country environment. Second, 
knowledge transfers, which are intended (and internalized) flows of knowledge 
from the MNE to its host-country environment. A final contribution of the 
paper is th a t it also considers institutional heterogeneity - notably intellectual 
property rights protection (IPP) - and how this interacts with the two types of 
knowledge diffusion just mentioned.
Our theoretical results demonstrate the opposing influences of pecuniary
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effects, direct and indirect demand effects, and knowledge diffusion on domes­
tic firms, following from an increase in MNE ownership in foreign aff liates. 
Nonetheless, we are able to  derive some (conditional) unambiguous predictions: 
We find th a t forward or downstream host-country effects following an increase 
in MNE ownership are generally positive, provided th a t there is suff cient down­
stream competition. Backward or upstream effects are also positive in countries 
with high IPP, provided th a t inter alia downstream demand elasticities and 
local input shares are suff ciently high. The intra-industry effects are generally 
positive in low-IPP countries, provided th a t the share of fixed costs in total 
costs of domestic firms is sufficiently high.
We then take these theoretical predictions to  the data, by employing a firm- 
level panel dataset, containing 1222 large domestic firms and 351 foreign sub­
sidiaries with varying degrees of MNE ownership, active in 20 countries and 18 
industries during the period 2000-2005. Our theoretical findings on the inter­
industry effects are largely confirmed by the data. The empirical results on the 
intra-industry effects are not entirely in line with the theoretical expectations, 
which we argue might be due to  some assumptions in the model. Generally 
speaking, the empirical results suggest th a t high-IPP countries are better able 
to  reap the benefits of MNE investment than  low-IPP countries.
The empirical part of the paper also provides two methodological advan­
tages over some of the earlier studies already undertaken in this area (cf. Blom- 
ström and Sjöholm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 2002; Javorcik, 2004; Javorcik 
and Spatareanu, 2008). First, unlike earlier studies, we utilize a cross-country 
sample which allows us to  investigate how institutional heterogeneity (such as 
differences in IPP  regimes) interacts with the relationship between MNE own­
ership and host-country productivity effects. Second, in stead of considering 
dichotomous or discrete differences in MNE ownership (e.g. minority versus 
majority, or shared ownership versus full ownership), we trea t MNE ownership 
as a continuous variable in the empirical part as well. Given the ex ante the­
oretical ambiguity of the relationship between MNE ownership and knowledge 
diffusion, next to  the usual parametric regression techniques we also employ 
semi-parametric regression techniques which allows us to  refrain from specify­
ing a specific functional form regarding the relationships of interest.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops a theoreti­
cal model, based on Markusen and Venables (1999) and extends it with the the­
oretical elements mentioned above. Section 3 analyzes the within and between 
industry-effects of changes in MNE ownership on local firms, and how these ef­
fects depend on the extent of IPP. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology 
and gives an overview of the data used in this paper. Section 5 presents the 
estimation results of the empirical model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 T h e  m o d e l
Before discussing the setup of the model, it is instructive to  consider Figure 1 
below, which presents a schematic representation of the theoretical model. A
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MNE sets up a shared foreign subsidiary in sector k in the host economy to 
produce for and sell on the local market. As such, it competes with local firms 
th a t are also active in sector k, but a t the same time it also spills over knowledge 
to  these firms. These are intra-industry or horizontal knowledge spillovers. The 
industry the MNE invests in may be a downstream industry -  receiving inputs 
from local firms in j  as indicated by situation A -  or an upstream industry -  
delivering inputs to  firms in industry l. If situation A is a t hand, local firms 
active in sector j  supply the foreign subsidiary and local firms in sector k with 
intermediates, but a t the same time also receive knowledge transfer from the 
foreign subsidiary, e.g. through supplier assistance (Javorcik, 2008). This type 
of knowledge transfer is called backward or upstream knowledge transfer. If 
situation B  is relevant, the foreign subsidiary and local firms in sector k may 
also function as input suppliers themselves, selling intermediates to  local firms 
in sector l. Simultaneously, these local sector l firms may receive knowledge 
transfer from the foreign subsidiary, e.g. in the form of increased input quality 
(Javorcik, 2008). Whichever situation occurs, these types of knowledge transfer 
are inter-industry or vertical in nature. In addition to  vertical knowledge trans­
fer, changes in the demand and supply of goods along the input and output 
linkages will cause backward and forward demand effects, leading to  pecuniary 
spillovers.
< <  IN S E R T  F IG U R E  1 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
In what follows we will first focus on part A of Figure 1. T hat is, we will first 
consider the situation in which the MNE has a shared subsidiary in the down­
stream sector (k) of the host economy and receives supplies from the upstream 
sector (j). After having derived the model for this setup, we will also indicate 
how the model changes when considering part B, where the foreign subsidiary 
is active in the upstream sector (k), supplying local firms in the downstream 
sector (l).
In our model there are two types of firms: Multinationals (m) and national 
firms (n), the latter of which can be further classified as local partners (lp), 
downstream firms (d) and upstream firms (u). We assume tha t MNEs require 
a local partner to  set up a foreign subsidiary in the host country: The resulting 
shared subsidiary can be thought of as an International Joint Venture ( I J V ) .1 
This I J V  competes with the downstream firm d, and both of them are supplied 
by the upstream firm u.
The theoretical model below builds on and extends Markusen and Venables 
(1999). These authors develop a multi-sector partial equilibrium model, where 
they analyze the effect of MNE entry in a downstream industry on the number of
1 A couple of rem arks apply here: F irst, note th a t  we assum e th a t  the  M NE needs a local 
p a rtn e r, i.e. we do not m odel the  decision betw een a greenfield versus a shared subsidiary 
nor th e  search process for a su itable p a rtn e r. Second, even though  th e  shared  subsidiary may 
be thought of as an I J V , we assum e th a t the  na tional firm is com pletely absorbed in the 
partnersh ip  and does not have any rem aining operations of its own. From  th a t  perspective, 
th e  partnersh ip  m ay have m ore resem blance to  a p a rtia l acquisition. T h ird , we assum e th a t 
there  is always a suff cient supply of local partners.
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local firms active in upstream and downstream industries. The effects of MNE 
entry work via competition effects and demand linkages (leading to  pecuniary 
externalities). Our setup resembles theirs in a number of ways: We also utilize 
a two industry setup, in which each industry is characterized by Dixit-Stiglitz 
monopolistic competition. Further, we also look at pecuniary externalities via 
demand linkages between the upstream and downstream industries. Yet our 
model also differs from theirs in three im portant aspects: First, we introduce 
shared ownership between the MNE and a local partner in the foreign subsidiary, 
as investigating the effect of a change in MNE ownership on the productivity 
of local firms is the primary focus of this paper. Second, next to  pecuniary 
spillovers, we also introduce direct and explicit knowledge diffusion. Moreover, 
we disentangle these knowledge diffusion effects into knowledge spillovers (hor­
izontal) and knowledge transfers (vertical), and consider their contingency on 
IP P  protection. Finally, we do not consider the effect of MNE entrance or 
ownership on the entry or exit of local firms, by keeping the number of firms 
constant when taking to tal derivatives (cf. Section 3).
Once again recall th a t we first consider part A of Figure 1, where I J V s  are 
active in the downstream industry (together with local downstream firms d) and 
are supplied by local upstream firms u. We model the price index of the inputs 
produced by local upstream firms in CES fashion and denote it by:
where n u are the number of local upstream firms, pu are individual prices of 
upstream inputs and a > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two 
input varieties. Suppose for the moment th a t total demand for inputs from the 
downstream sector is given by I . Then, multiplying Pu  by I  gives to tal costs 
of input supply, or equivalently, to tal expenditures on inputs. Hence, we can 
apply Shephard’s lemma to derive demand for individual inputs x u:
In the downstream sector we have a similar industry structure, but here both 
national firms and IJ V s  are active. Hence, the price index in the downstream 
sector is given by:
where n¿ ( n i j v ) is the number of local firms ( I J V s) active in the downstream 
sector, pd ( p i j v ) are the prices these firms charge, and e >  1 is the elasticity 
of substitution between any two varieties. The volume of total consumer de­
mand for these downstream products is given by Y and to tal expenditure on 
downstream goods is given by Y P DV where r  is the elasticity of demand with 
respect to  the price index P d . Similar to  Markusen and Venables (1999), we 
assume th a t e >  r .>  1. Again applying Shephard’s lemma we obtain individual 
demands:
P u  =  (nupU a) (1)
(2)
PD =  (n dpd " +  n IJVp]jV  )1/(1 v)
Xd =  P / Y PD n
x i j v  = p[ j v y p d V
(3)
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First consider the profit function of the I J V  which is given by:
n i j v  =  PiJVx i j v  — ( F i j v  + ß i j v x i j v ) [aPu +  (1 — a)w] (4)
where p denotes price, x denotes output, F  are fixed costs, ß  are marginal 
production costs, w is the wage rate of labor, and a  is the share of inputs 
sourced from the upstream sector (0 <  a  <  1). Note th a t the amount of inputs 
sourced from the upstream sector depends on the amount of fixed costs and 
variable costs. The remaining share (1 — a)  is spent on labor as an additional 
production factor.
As mentioned, the I J V  is a partnership between a MNE (m ) and a local 
partner (lp). We assume th a t the contribution of both firms in terms of technol­
ogy and knowledge to  the I J V  is proportional to  their ownership shares in the 
IJV, which is given by p for the MNE and (1 — p) for the local partner. These 
contributions translate into the fixed and marginal production costs of the I J V  
and are modelled as follows:
F i j v  = pFm +  (1 -  p)Fn (5)
ß i j v  = pßm +  (1 _  p)ßn
where we assume Fp = Fd = Fu = Fn, i.e. fixed costs of all national firms are 
equal, regardless of their type, and similarly for ß . In line with earlier literature 
(Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999), as well as with the firm characteristics in our 
own sample (see Section 5), we assume th a t Fm < Fn and ß m < ß n i.e. the 
MNE is more productive than  a national firm, both in term s of fixed costs as 
well as marginal costs. Hence, the larger the ownership share of the MNE in 
the I J V , the lower I J V  fixed and marginal costs will be, which is in line with 
the literature on internalization or transaction costs and technology transfer 
(Davies, 1992).
A key issue of this paper is the nature and extent of knowledge diffusion 
from the I J V  to  the national firms. As we already explained, we make an 
explicit distinction between unintended knowledge spillovers on the one hand, 
and intended knowledge transfer on the other. This distinction is especially 
im portant in the present context, since we conjecture th a t the type of knowledge 
diffusion is contingent on the direction of diffusion, i.e. horizontal or vertical.
Specifically, we argue th a t knowledge spillovers from the I J V  are most likely 
to  flow horizontally, i.e. to  downstream firms d active in the same sector, for the 
I J V  has nothing to  gain from intentionally transferring knowledge or technology 
to  its competitors. Moreover, since these firms are active in the same sector, 
their absorptive capacity can be expected to  be relatively high. Intentional 
knowledge transfers on the other hand, are more likely to  flow vertically, i.e. 
from the I J V  to local upstream firms u (in situation A of Figure 1), since the 
I J V  will benefit from this by increased quality or decreased prices of inputs. 
Indeed, there exists ample evidence of MNEs th a t assist their suppliers in terms 
of technology transfer, or transfer of best practices or quality standards (Javorcik
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and Spatareanu, 2005; Javorcik, 2008).2
In the context of knowledge diffusion, the extent of IPP  also becomes rele­
vant (Branstetter et al., 2006) since the purpose of IPP  is to  reduce knowledge 
spillovers. As a consequence we may expect opposite effects of IPP  on (hori­
zontal) knowledge spillovers on the one hand, and (vertical) knowledge transfer 
on the other hand: If IP P  functions properly, horizontal knowledge spillovers 
should be reduced. At the same time however, due to  the decreased risk of 
expropriation of knowledge, this increases the incentives for the I J V  to (verti­
cally) transfer knowledge. Hence, upstream knowledge transfer should increase 
with IP P .3
As we have assumed th a t MNE knowledge transfer to  the I J V  takes effect 
through fixed and marginal costs, it is only natural to  assume th a t knowledge 
diffusion from the I J V  to downstream and upstream firms will also affect their 
fixed and marginal cost structures. Hence, for local downstream firms, we model 
fixed and marginal costs after spillovers as:
FS = 9Fd +  (1 -  9)F i jv  (6) 
ßS =  ^ß d +  (1 _  ®)ß i j v
where d is a parameter capturing the strength of Intellectual Property Rights 
protection (IPP), with d =  1 denoting perfect protection and d =  0 no protection 
whatsoever. Hence, spillovers are maximized when d = 0 ,  implying th a t the 
fixed and marginal cost structures of I J V s can be copied perfectly.
For intentional knowledge transfers from the I J V  to local upstream firms 
we then have:
FT = (1 -  e)Fu + OFijv  (7) 
ßU =  (1 _  0)ßu +  Oß i j v
Note th a t because knowledge transfer is intentional (as opposed to  spillovers) the 
I  JV  is more willing to  transfer its technology as the extent of IPP  increases (d 
increases), since the risk of expropriation is very small in th a t case (Branstetter 
et al., 2006).
The local upstream firm has the following formulation for profits:
ïïu pux u (Fu +  ß u x u)w (8)
We can derive the equilibrium price for the upstream firm by substituting equi­
librium demand (2) into (8) and maximize profits, which yields:
p u =
oU 
a ß u w 
(a -  1)
2 We do not consider explicit learning w ith in  the  I J V  by any of th e  two parties involved 
(for an analysis of th is type, see M üller and Schnitzer, 2006).
3 A part from th e  theoretical relevance of in troducing IP P  in th is m anner, its opposite effects 
on knowledge spillovers and transfers also allow us to  tes t our hypothesized difference betw een 
horizontal and vertical knowledge diffusion empirically.
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It directly follows from this expression th a t MNEs benefit from technology trans­
fer to  upstream firms, since this decreases ß  u and hence decreases input prices
pu.
Local downstream firms have the following profit function:
nd =  pdxd -  (F S +  ß I xd)(aPu  +  (1 -  a)w)  (9)
the interpretation of which is similar to  th a t of the IJV .4 The equilibrium pricing 
condition is found by substituting xd from (3) into (9) and maximizing profits:
eßS (aPu  +  (1 — a)w)
pd =  -------------------------------
Note th a t on top of the knowledge spillovers through ß %, the backward demand 
linkage from MNEs to upstream firms poses an additional benefit to the lo­
cal downstream firm as it serves to decrease Pu  as well, which constitutes an 
(indirect) forward linkage.
Finally, for the I J V  we obtain a similar pricing condition:
" ß i j v (aPu  +  (1 -  a)w)
p i j v  =  ( 7 T Ï
We can now close the model by also writing down derived demand for the 
upstream firm’s products, which is generated by the input demand from the 
I J V  and the domestic firm in the downstream sector:5
I  =  a n i j v  (Fi j v  +  ß i j v  x i j v  ) +  a n d(Fd +  ßS xd) (10)
So far, we have only considered part A of Figure 1, i.e. the situation in 
which the I J V  is active in the downstream sector generating horizontal intra­
industry effects as well as upstream or backward effects through inter-industry 
linkages. In order to analyze downstream or forward linkages, we also consider 
the situation in which the I J V  is active in the upstream industry (together 
with local firms) and supplying local firms in the downstream industry. That 
is, part B  of Figure 1.6 Because the model remains largely the same, except
4Note th a t  we assume (unlike M arkusen and Venables, 1999) th a t a j j v  =  ad  =  a.  Al­
though it has been argued th a t  M NEs (or I J V s) will po tentially  source less of their inputs 
in the host-country, we have no way of distinguishing between a j j v  and ad  in the em pirical 
p a rt of the paper, so th a t we prefer the current specification. However, we will come back 
to  the  implied relationship betw een a  and M NE ownership p when discussing the em pirical 
results later on.
5Coming back to our earlier rem ark, we again note th a t we refrain from deriving free entry 
(i.e. zero profit) conditions, bu t instead assum e th a t these are fulfilled in b o th  sectors. A 
po ten tia l problem  in th is case is th a t  the  cost stru c tu re  of the  two firm types in the downstream  
sector ( I J V s and ds) differ. Specifically, given th a t I J V s are m ore efficient th an  ds, imposing 
a zero-profit condition for ds would imply positive profits for I J V  s. In order to  prevent th is 
s ituation  from ocurring, we assum e th a t  any resulting positive profits from I J V s  are absorbed 
by added co-ordination costs betw een the M NE and its local partner.
6We already noted above th a t  in the m odel setup discussed so far, we do have indirect 
forward linkages to  the dow nstream  local firms which are contingent on the upstream  linkage,
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for the fact th a t the I J V  switches industries, we will not fully write it down 
here (Appendix A ). However, note th a t in this case it is the upstream firm th a t 
benefits from knowledge spillovers, whereas the downstream firm benefits from 
knowledge transfer. This also implies th a t the moderating effects of IPP  change 
accordingly. In the next section we will analyze the comparative static effects 
of a change in MNE ownership in the I J V  (p) on the profits of local firms for 
both situations A  and B.
3 In tra  and  in ter-in d u stry  effects o f  M N E  ow n­
ersh ip
3 .1  I J V s  i n  t h e  d o w n s t r e a m  s e c t o r
Since our main interest in this paper concerns the effects of MNE ownership in 
the I J V  (p) on local firms through demand linkages, competition effects and 
knowledge diffusion, we investigate the effect of p on local firms’ profits. In 
order to  do this, we compute total derivatives with respect to  p while assuming 
th a t all other variables remain unchanged. First consider the effect of MNE 
ownership in the downstream industry on upstream firms’ profits:
d I I  p 1 ® P ® p
_ _ u  = P u  ^  u b L } + ^ppEE} + k t }  (n )
?0 <0 >0
where B L 1, P E 1 and K T 1 are a backward linkage effect, a price effect and a 
knowledge transfer effect respectively, the full expressions of which are given in 
Appendix B1.
The knowledge transfer effect K T 1 is straightforward: An increase in MNE 
ownership in the IJV increases explicit knowledge transfer to  the upstream firm 
by decreasing fixed and variable costs, increasing upstream firms’ profits. More­
over, the larger the IPP  (i.e the larger d), the larger is this positive effect.
The negative upstream price effect P E 1 is due to  our assumption of ho­
mogeneity of firms and their interrelationships, so tha t all upstream firms are 
affected by an increase in p in the same way. Specifically, the decrease in ^  
following an increase in p decreases upstream prices pu . This effectively reduces 
the price index in the upstream industry Pu , i.e. it depresses per firm revenue 
in this sector. This effect is stronger the larger is d due to  increased knowledge 
transfer.
The effect of p through the backward demand linkage (B L 1) has three com­
ponents in d _ u/dp  (see Appendix). First, there is a negative indirect knowledge 
spillover effect, which occurs because of the increase in knowledge spillovers to 
the local downstream firm as a result of an increase in p , making downstream
since they  will be affected by changes in P u  induced by changes in M NE ownership in the  I J V  
(p). However, in the  em pirical section, we will also investigate the  direct forward linkages, i.e. 
th e  linkage effects of an I J V  directly  supplying local firms, so th a t we also have to  consider 
th is case theoretically.
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firms more efficient. This implies less demand for x u since less inputs are needed 
to  produce the same output. Also note th a t the negative effect of knowledge 
spillovers is moderated by the extent of IPP: The larger 8, the smaller knowl­
edge spillovers to  the local downstream firm and hence, the smaller its negative 
influence on demand for intermediate inputs. This adds to  the positive direct 
effect of 8  through K T 1.
Second, there are positive downstream demand effects, induced by the change 
in demand for downstream firm products after an increase in p . Since fixed and 
marginal costs of downstream firms are reduced, as well as the fact th a t input 
prices Pu  go down, prices for downstream products fall, inducing an increase 
in demand for downstream products and accordingly also for upstream inputs. 
The impact of 8  on this effect is twofold: On the one hand, an increase in 8  
decreases knowledge spillovers to  local downstream firms, thus limiting the price 
decrease of these firms and limiting the increase in derived input demand. On 
the other hand, an increase in 8  raises knowledge transfer to  the upstream firm, 
lowering input prices and downstream prices, thus increasing derived demand 
for inputs again. However, this latter effect is a second order effect, so th a t in 
this case, IPP  will most likely exert a negative effect on I u .
The third effect which takes place through the backward demand linkage 
(B L 1) is a downstream price effect. As we will see below as well (when analyzing 
d_d/dp)  an increase in p decreases individual prices of all downstream firms, 
and thereby also the price index Pd . T hat is to  say, an increase in p eventually 
decreases per firm revenue in the downstream sector. This in turn  has a negative 
impact on derived demand for upstream inputs and accordingly on upstream 
profits.
We now turn  to  the national firm in the downstream industry (i.e. the 
competitor of the I J V ). Recall th a t two clear differences with the upstream 
firm are th a t (i) the downstream firm is not vertically linked with the I J V  
and (ii) knowledge diffusion occurs through knowledge spillovers rather than 
knowledge transfer. Computing the to tal derivative of _  with respect to  p 
yields:
d p  =  (e -  V) ^  p d P E ß  +  Kz 1  +  I D L }  (12)
<0 >0 >0
where P E 2 , K S 1 and I D L 1 are a price effect, a knowledge spillover effect, 
and an indirect demand linkage effect respectively (the explicit expressions are 
relegated to  Appendix B2).
First, the price effect (P E 2) works through the price index Pd . Due to  the 
increase in p , I J V  cost structures improve because of increased intra-firm knowl­
edge transfer, making I J V s more competitive. Moreover, since the increase in 
p also increases horizontal knowledge spillovers, contingent on the lack of IPP 
(1 — 8), each individual national firm in the downstream industry is confronted 
with a decrease in Pd , a decrease in per firm revenue, and hence a decrease in 
profits.
Second, there is the direct knowledge spillover effect (K S 1), occurring through 
the fixed and marginal cost structure and again contingent on the absence of
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IP P  protection (1 — 6). This effect is obviously positive.
Finally, the downstream national firm also profits from the vertical link­
age between the I J V s and the upstream firms, albeit in an indirect way via 
Pu ( IDLi) .  Indeed, since backward knowledge transfer from the I J V  to  the 
upstream firm increases with p (see above), national downstream firms are con­
fronted with lower input prices Pu  . The extent of this positive indirect linkage 
is contingent on the input share a  as well as on the extent of IP P  6 . Regarding 
the latter, this poses a counter-acting force to  the direct knowledge spillovers 
from the I J V  to  the downstream firm: To benefit more from these spillovers, 
the downstream firm requires a lower 6  (first-order), but to  benefit from lower 
input prices, it requires a higher 6  (second-order).
3 .2  I J V s  i n  t h e  u p s t r e a m  s e c t o r
Now we will consider the situation in which the I J V s (and local firms) are active 
in the upstream sector, hence supplying local firms in the downstream sector 
(situation B  in Figure 1). The analysis is similar to  the one before, but recall 
th a t in this situation the local upstream firms benefit from knowledge diffu­
sion through knowledge spillovers, whereas the downstream firms receive MNE 
knowledge through knowledge transfer. First consider the effect of an increase 
in p on local upstream firms’ profits (the explicit formulations are relegated to 
Appendix B3):
^  =  pu (ID L 2 +  P E 3)  +  K S 2  (13)
dp a <0 <0 >0
As before, there are three effects: An indirect demand linkage effect (ID L 2), a 
price effect (P E 3) and a knowledge spillover effect (K S 2). First, the indirect 
demand linkage takes effect as a result of an increase in knowledge transfer 
from the I J V  to  the local downstream firms. As they become more efficient, the 
derived input demand decreases, lowering upstream firms’ profits. Moreover, the 
higher IPP  (i.e. the higher 6), the more knowledge is transferred downstream 
and the larger the negative effect on n „ . Second, as similar as before, the 
price effect occurs because knowledge spillovers to  local upstream firms and 
knowledge transfer by the MNE to the I J V  affect all firms in the upstream 
sector simultaneously. This lowers the price index P u and thus also per firm 
revenue. Moreover, the extent to  which knowledge spillovers add to  this effect 
is larger the lower 6 . Third, the knowledge spillover effect obviously increases 
upstream profits, and this effect becomes stronger the lower is 6.
Finally, for local downstream firms we now have (the explicit formulations 
are relegated to  Appendix B4):
d p t  =  PEE} + KEZ}+ F L  (14)<0 >0 >0
We can distinguish a price effect (P E 4), a knowledge transfer effect (K T 2 ) and 
a forward linkage effect (F L 1). The negative price effect occurs because all
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downstream firms are similarly affected by knowledge transfer and decreased 
input prices. T hat is, they all become more productive and charge lower prices, 
thus decreasing per firm revenue. Note th a t 6  has an ambiguous effect on this 
mechanism: On the one hand, it magnifies the negative effect through increased 
knowledge transfer, but on the other hand it reduces it through decreased knowl­
edge spillovers to  upstream firms (and hence, a smaller decrease in input prices). 
The knowledge transfer effect obviously increases downstream firm profits, and 
the more so the higher is 6 . Finally, the forward linkage effect occurs because 
knowledge spillovers from the I J V  to  local upstream firms, as well as knowledge 
transfer from the MNE to the I J V , decrease input prices for downstream firms, 
thus increasing their profits. In this case, an increase in 6  has an unambiguously 
negative effect, as it serves to  decrease knowledge spillovers.
3 .3  S ig n i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s
All to tal derivatives derived contain effects th a t are opposite in sign. Moreover, 
as can be seen from the expressions in the Appendix, deriving conditions under 
which their sign is unambiguous is not straightforward for most of these deriv­
atives. A lot of this ambiguity is caused by the often opposing effects of IPP
(6). Indeed, as it turns out, many of the expressions simplify substantially when 
considering the extreme cases, i.e. when 6  = 0  or 6  =  1. In Table 1 below we 
summarize the signs of the to tal derivatives, also considering the cases in which 
6  =  {0,1}. The derivations can be found in the Appendix.
< <  IN S E R T  T A B L E  1 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
First consider the effects through backward linkages, i.e. dP u/dp  with MNEs 
downstream. When 6  is variable or when 6  =  0, the effect of a change in p on 
upstream profits is indeterminate in (11). However, given th a t the conditions 
in Table 1 are met, the effect is unambiguously positive for 6  =  1. Obviously, 
6  =  1 indicates perfect IPP  and upstream knowledge transfer by the MNE is 
at its maximum, ceteris paribus maximizing the positive effect of K T 1 in (11). 
Moreover, the condition implies th a t the positive effect is more likely (i) the 
smaller are to tal variable costs relative to t to tal fixed costs in the downstream 
industry (the LHS of the condition), (ii) the larger is a  and (iii) the larger is r¡. 
The latter effect is caused by the fact th a t a higher r  - implying a more price- 
sensitive downstream demand - translates the downstream price decrease (due to 
a decrease in Pu  following increased knowledge transfer) into higher downstream 
demand, and thus also higher derived demand for upstream intermediates. This 
effect in tu rn  is larger, the larger is the intermediate input share of downstream 
firms a . The first effect occurs through the backward demand linkage B L i : 
Since downstream fixed costs are only affected through knowledge spillovers, 
whereas marginal costs both through knowledge spillovers and price effects, the 
to tal negative effect on upstream firms of these combined effects will be lower, 
the smaller are variable costs relative to  fixed costs.
Next consider the effects through forward linkages, i.e. dP^/dp  with MNEs 
upstream. The table shows th a t in all cases, e > 2 is a sufficient condition for this
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derivative to  be positive. The reason for this is th a t although the negative price 
effect P E 4  in (14) becomes more severe when downstream products become 
better substitutes (i.e. when e is higher), at the same time also the positive 
impact of both K T 2  and F L 1 are relatively more pronounced; the resulting 
downstream price decreases th a t follow from them  have a larger impact on firm 
profits when e is higher. These two positive effects consistently outweigh the 
negative effect of P E 4  when e >  2 .
Finally, in order to  consider the intra-industry effects of a change in p , we 
have to  consider both dPd/dp  with MNEs downstream, as well as dPu/dp  with 
MNEs upstream, for in practice MNEs will simultaneously serve as downstream 
(customer) firms for some local companies, and as upstream (supplier) firms for 
others. First consider dP^/dp  with MNEs downstream: We see th a t in both 
the extreme cases (6 =  0,1) its sign is unambiguously positive. The reason is 
th a t in both cases, one of either two positive effects in (12) is maximized, which 
more then compensates the remaining negative effect of P E 2. Specifically, when 
6  =  0, K S 1 is maximized and when 6  =  1, I D L 1 is maximized. For dPu/dp 
with MNEs upstream, we see a conditional positive effect when 6  =  0 and an 
unconditional negative effect when 6  =  1. The latter is obvious: If 6  =  1, K S 2  
in (13) is zero, so th a t only the negative effects of I D L 2  and P E 3 remain. When 
6  = 0 , the negative effect of I D L 2  disappears and the effect of K S 2  is maximized. 
The condition states th a t the larger fixed costs are relative to  marginal costs 
(or more precisely: the more im portant the effect of knowledge diffusion on 
fixed rather than  marginal costs) the more likely it is th a t dPu/dp > 0. The 
reason is th a t the negative price effect P E 1 only works through marginal costs, 
whereas the positive knowledge spillover effect K S 2  works both through fixed 
and marginal costs. Taken together, these effects imply th a t horizontal (intra­
industry) effects of increasing p are positive if 6  =  0 and fixed costs are large 
relative to  marginal costs, whereas they are ambiguous if 6  =  1.
In the remainder of this paper we will empirically explore these insights re­
garding the horizontal and vertical effects of MNE ownership on local firms. 
Moreover, the cross-country nature of our firm panel also allows us the empiri­
cally investigate the derived effects of differences in IPP.
4 D a ta  and  m eth o d o lo g y
4 .1  M e t h o d o l o g y
Although our theoretical model derives predictions regarding the relationship 
between firm profits and MNE ownership, the extant literature on knowledge 
diffusion from FDI usually considers the effect of MNE presence on local firms’ 
productivity. In order to  enhance comparability of our results, we also follow 
this approach in the empirical section of the paper. Moreover, from the profit 
functions in Section 2 it is clear th a t there exists a positive and proportional 
relationship between firm productivity and firm profits.
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The empirical model th a t we will estimate takes the following generic form:
! i jkt  =  ß 0  +  ßiHorizontal jkt  +  ß 2 Backwardjkt +  ß 3 Forwardjkt (15)
+ ß 4X it +  Dj +  D k +  eijkt
where i, j , k and t  index firm, industry, country and time (year) respectively, 
!  is firm level productivity, Horizontal  is a measure of intra-industry MNE 
presence, Backward (Forward)  is a measure of MNE presence in customer 
or downstream (supplier or upstream) industries, X  is a vector of firm level 
control variables, Dj  and Dk are two sets of industry and country dummies, 
e is an error term  which is clustered at the industry level and assumed to  be 
normally distributed, and the ß ’s are the parameters to  be estimated. The 
precise measurement of these variables is explained below.
A well-known problem with empirical models such as the one in (15) is the 
measurement of the dependent variable. Productivity is usually computed as 
the error term  of a production function. However, to  the extent th a t (expected) 
changes in productivity are observed or anticipated by firms’ managers, the 
requirement of independence between the error term  and the independent vari­
ables is violated, since managers may adjust variable inputs and production 
factors (such as labor) in anticipation of productivity changes.
Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest a robust estimator to  tackle this issue. The 
underlying idea is tha t there exists a relationship between unobserved produc­
tivity on the one hand, and observable investment and capital on the other hand. 
Using this relationship, one can control for productivity in the production func­
tion estimation, by adding the function of investment and capital in addition to 
labor and capital (and material) inputs .7 Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) extend 
this approach to  situations in which there are a lot of zero observations on firm 
level investment, in which case it is not possible to  invert the investment func­
tion, and hence to  derive the productivity function. Since virtually all of our 
firms have positive observations on investment, we will use the Olley and Pakes 
(1996) procedure to  estimate productivity .8
One im portant additional issue we need to  tackle is the fact th a t our theo­
retical model does not suggest a clear functional form regarding the relationship 
between MNE ownership in its subsidiary and local firm profits (and produc­
tivity). This can be noted from the expressions of the to tal derivatives (cf. 
Appendix), which themselves are polynomial functions of MNE ownership p . 
Moreover, the degree of the polynomial in p depends on the elasticities of sub­
stitution and demand. A second issue in this regard is th a t some parameters in 
our model may be functions of p themselves, such as the different elasticities of 
substitution or the input and output shares, which further induces the different 
to tal derivatives to  be (polynomial) functions of p . Hence it would be inappro­
priate to  specify a functional form empirically ex ante. Fortunately, we can use
7 Since the  appropria te  functional form of th e  function of investm ent and cap ital is not 
known, Olley and Pakes (1996) use a th ird -order polynom ial expansion in b o th  variables to 
proxy th e  function . We follow th is procedure in our p roduction  function estim ation .
8 In  order to em pirically im plem ent the  estim ator, we use a program m e developed by A rnold 
(2003).
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(semiparametric) partial linear regression analysis to  get a clue regarding the 
proper empirical specification.
Specifically, the generic partial linear regression model in our case takes the 
following form:
Vi =  g(zj  ) + i  X i +  rij  (16)
where i and j  again index firm and industry respectively, g(z) is the nonpara- 
metric component of the model for which the functional form is determined 
using a Kernel estimator, X  is a vector of (firm level) variables th a t enter the 
model in the usual parametric fashion, and r is an error term. In the context 
of the present paper, the variables measuring MNE presence would enter the 
non-parametric component, whereas the control variables enter the parametric 
component.
The model in (16) can be estimated by using a difference estimator (Robin­
son, 1988). Lokshin (2006) proposes the following estimator of the model, based 
on Yatchew (1997), where the observations are ordered as zi <  z2 <  .. <  z n :
m m m m
dk Vi-k = ^ 2  dk g(z i-k  ) +  1  ^ 2  dk Xi-k I +  X  dk r i - k  (17) 
k—1 k—1 \k —1 J k— 1
where m  is the order of differencing and the d’s are the differencing weights.9 
When optimal weights d are chosen, OLS estimation can be consistently applied 
to  (17) in order to  obtain estimates for the parametric part of the model. If 
we denote the resulting estimator by fd i f f  we can retrieve the nonparametric 
component in (16) as follows:
Vi -  1fdiff x i =  g (zj ) +  (i  -  Tdiff)X i +  ei '  g(zj ) +  ri
We can then use a nonparametric estimator to  estimate the nonparametric com­
ponent g(zj ). Here we again follow Lokshin (2006) who proposes the use of a 
Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoother (lowess). Lowess belongs to  the class 
of Nearest Neighbours Estimators: It estimates local polynomials to  derive a 
functional form for g (.), based on the distribution of the observations in a zV- 
scatterplot. The local polynomial estimation is repeated over small parts of the 
distribution, where the partitioning (in so-called bandwidths) is variable. This 
results in a smoothed fit of the relationship between z  and V, which can be 
depicted in zy  space.
Finally, we need a way to  determine whether or not the nonparametric com­
ponent in (16) makes a significant contribution to  the model. Obviously, since 
we are not estimating any param eter values, we cannot use regular test statistics 
to  determine significance. Instead, Lokshin (2006) proposed the following test 
statistic:
V =  V m N (sr2es -  s d f f  )/sddiff -  N (0 ,1) (18)
9 These weights have to  satisfy two conditions: (i) ^ m  i dk =  0 , which assusres th a t  the  
nonparam etric  com ponent in (16) is removed since g(-) is assum ed to  be sm ooth, single-valued 
and to  have a bounded first derivative; (ii) j  d2 = 1  which assures th a t  the  residuals in 
(16) have variance .
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where s‘2es is the mean square residual of the parametric regression and sdif f  the 
squared residual of the semi-parametric regression. Hence, if this test statistic 
surpasses the standard normal critical values at usual significance levels, we 
can conclude th a t the nonparametric component contributes significantly to  the 
model in (16).
Despite the attractive property of not having to  specify an explicit functional 
form between productivity effects and MNE ownership, there are some other 
caveats of partial linear regression analysis. The most im portant of these is th a t 
the method of Lokshin (2006) is only applicable to  cross-section samples, so th a t 
we loose a lot of information contained in the time-series dimension of the data. 
The second drawback is th a t this method does not allow for clustering of the 
error term, which is problematic when estimating firm-level productivity effects 
while using firm and sector level explanatory variables. Third, because of the 
need for a fairly large sample to  consistently estimate the partial linear model 
(the so-called curse of dimensionality in semiparametric and non-parametric 
regression analysis), it is unwarranted to  split up the sample according to  IPP 
levels, as this would heavily reduce the size of the resulting subsamples. Because 
of these drawbacks, we use the semiparametric approach mainly for exploratory 
purposes, and revert to  a more standard parametric specification to  tackle these 
three issues.
Summarizing, in order to  obtain a proper estimate of our dependent vari­
able in model (15) we use the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure. Moreover, 
since we have no clear theoretical indications regarding the proper functional 
form of the relationship between firm productivity and MNE ownership, we use 
semiparametric regression analysis to  find the best parametric specification for 
this relationship. We will then take the functional forms suggested by the par­
tial linear regression models and impose it in a standard parametric regression 
model like the one in (15).
4 .2  D a t a
Our sample contains a short panel of 1549 large, publicly traded firms th a t are 
active in 20 countries and 18 sectors during the period 2000-2005. Of these 
firms, 327 are partly owned by an foreign company. In order to  obtain the 
production function parameters with the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure, we 
estimated production functions at the two-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. A full list of 
countries and sectors is included in the Appendix.
Our main variable of interest, i.e. the extent of intra-industry MNE presence, 
is computed as follows (cf. Javorcik, 2004):
Horizontalj t  =  X SaleSit) s.t. 0 <  pi <  1 (19)
j E '  SaleSit i
where nj  is the number of foreign-owned subsidiaries present in sector j ,  Nj  
is the to tal number of firms in sector j , pi is the share of MNE ownership in 
the subsidiaries, and SaleSi are the amount of firm-level sales. As with most
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empirical studies using MNE ownership, we only have observations for p in one 
year (2004), which we also use to  compute Horizontal  in the other years.
In line with Javorcik (2004), we use input and output shares (constructed 
from OECD I-O tables) to  compute forward and backward linkages.10 Specifi­
cally, if ajk  denotes the output share of sector j  flowing to  sector k (with j  =  k) 
backward linkages are computed as:
Backwardj t = ^ ^ X a jk X Horizontalkt) (20)
k=j
where Horizontalk  is defined as in (19). Hence, in line with the theoretical 
model developed in Section 2, the extent of backward linkages is proxied by the 
amount of inter-industry sales from industry j  to  k .
Forward linkages are computed in an analogous manner:
Forwardj t = ^^X^-ik X Horizontalkt ) (21)
j=k
where p,jk is the share of inputs th a t sector j  obtains from sector k. Javor- 
cik (2004) nets out exports from the host country to  other countries from 
Hoirzontalkt in this case,.since such exports are obviously not destined for local 
sector j . However, due to  lack of data we are not able to  follow this approach, 
and have to  settle with the computation in (21).
As explained in the previous section, our dependent variable is the produc­
tivity of local firms, computed using the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology, 
and using data on net sales and revenue, employment, net fixed capital stocks 
and to tal investment for the years 2000-2005.
We add two control variables: First, we use a measure of firm size, measured 
by (the log of) total assets of the firm. The expected sign of this variable is 
unclear: Some authors have argued th a t large firms are conducive to  innovation 
and hence productivity, because of economies of scale (Cohen and Klepper, 
1996). Yet others argue th a t resources are not easily and efficiently allocated 
in large firms, hence wasting productive resources and decreasing productivity 
(Acs and Audretsch, 1990). The sign of this variable is thus an empirical matter. 
Second, in order to  also incorporate a relative measure of firm size, we use the 
share of firm-sales in to tal industry-sales (i.e. market share) as an additional 
control variable. Again, the sign of this variable is not clear ex-ante. Table 2 
below presents some summary statistics and pairwise correlations between the 
variables.
< <  IN S E R T  T A B L E  2 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
We also have to  construct variables th a t enable us to  test the conditions in 
Table 1. For this purpose, we follow earlier research (Javorcik, 2004b ; Allred 
and Park, 2007) and use the Ginarte and Park (1997) dataset containing data
10 A lthough our d a ta  p e rta in  to th e  period 2000-2005, th e  m ost recent I-O tables available 
are from 2002, so th a t  we use these d a ta  to com pute in p u t-o u tp u t shares for the  entire period.
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on the strength of national IPP  systems .11 The most recent set of observations 
relate to  the year 2000, which are the ones we have used in the empirical part 
of the paper. The IP P  index is made up out of five different components, all 
rated on a 0 to  1 scale (cf. Ginarte and Park, 1996 for a detailed description of 
this index). Taken together, the IPP  index is measured along a 5 point scale, 
where a value of 0 indicates very weak IPP  and 5 indicates very strong IPP.
Regarding the horizontal productivity effects, we noted th a t they are more 
likely to  be positive under d =  0 when fixed costs make up a relative large share 
of to tal costs (i.e. fixed and variable costs). We use data on net fixed assets F  
(property, plant and equipment) to  capture firm-level fixed costs, and data on 
salaries and benefit expenses L  to  capture variable costs. We then construct a 
variable (F  +  L ) / L  which corresponds with the condition in Table 1.
For forward productivity effects ( d O /dp  with MNEs upstream) we estab­
lished th a t if the elasticity of substitution e between downstream products is 
large enough, this effect will be positive. If we interpret e as a measure of 
downstream competition (with higher e indicating more substitution and hence 
more competition) we can construct a Herfindahl index to  measure the inverse 
of e . Hence, for each country-industry-year combination in our sample, we con­
struct a Herfindahl index which captures all our sample-firms which belong to 
a particular sector.
Finally, the condition regarding backward productivity effects (dOu/dp  with 
MNEs downstream) depends inter alia on a  and r .  a  is already incorporated 
in the computation of (20). Since we do not have the data to  compute proper 
estimates of r ,  we will just focus on a  in the empirical part of the paper.
5 E m p irica l resu lts
5 .1  S e m i p a r a m e t r i c  r e s u l t s
Before turning to  the regression results, we first briefly consider the productiv­
ity difference between local firms and I J V s, since the presumed productivity 
superiority of MNEs and hence I J V s vis-à-vis local firms lies at the heart of our 
model, and as such at the hart of the knowledge diffusion process. Comparing 
the log of productivity levels of the 327 I J V s in our sample versus the 1222 local 
firms, the former have an average productivity of 5.80 and the latter 5.02. A 
paired t-test strongly rejects the equality of these two means (t =  14.3). Hence, 
the superiority of I J V s with respect to  local firms on productivity as assumed 
in our theoretical model is confirmed in our sample.
First we consider the results of the semiparametric partial linear regression 
model. We will investigate the effect of the three different MNE presence vari­
ables separately, in order to  obtain the empirical functional relationship between 
productivity and the relevant MNE ownership share. As explained in the pre­
vious section, the partial linear regression estimator we use is only applicable in 
cross-sections. Thus all results reported in this subsection pertain to  the year
11We th an k  professor Park  for sharing th e  u p d a ted  dataset.
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2004, which is the year in which the MNE ownership shares were observed. The 
results of the partial linear regression model are reported in Table 3 below. Fig­
ure 2 contains the resulting non-parametric relationship between productivity 
and each of the MNE presence variables.
The first column in Table 3 adds the horizontal variable from (19) to  the 
non-parametric component of the model. As indicated by the test statistic V  
from (18), the non-parametric component enters the model highly significantly. 
Panel (a) in Figure 2 depicts the implied relationship. We find th a t an increase 
in MNE ownership in the IJV  increases local firms’ productivity. However, it 
is also clear th a t this relationship is not linear, but characterized by decreasing 
returns to  MNE ownership at low levels of MNE ownership, and increasing 
returns to  MNE ownership at high levels. Hence, the semiparametric model 
suggests a cubic relationship between intra-industry MNE ownership and local 
firms’ productivity.
< <  IN S E R T  T A B L E  3 A B O U T  H E R E  > >  
< <  IN S E R T  F IG U R E  2 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
In the second column we put the backward variable from (20) in the non- 
parametric component. The test statistic V  again indicates th a t the non- 
parametric component enters the model highly significantly, and panel (b) in 
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the downstream MNE ownership share 
and upstream local firms’ productivity. The figure demonstrates a quadratic re­
lationship, although the 95% confidence interval around this relationship is quite 
large.
Finally, in column three of Table 3 we put the forward variable from (21) 
in the non-parametric component of the model. Forward spillovers enter the 
model highly significantly and from panel (c) in Figure 2 we see th a t the re­
lationship between upstream MNE ownership and downstream productivity of 
local customers is again characterized by a quadratic relationship. But also in 
this case, the 95% confidence interval is rather wide.
Both firm size and market share are significant and positive, indicating th a t 
both absolute firm size as well as firm size relative to  the market are conducive 
to  productivity. In terms of model fit, the models perform rather well, indicat­
ing th a t the industry and country fixed effects also absorb a lot of the variation 
in firm productivity. However, in order to  tackle the three problems described 
in the previous section, we have to  revert to  parametric regression analysis. In 
doing so, we can use the outcomes of the semiparametric models as guide regard­
ing the parametric model specification. Specifically, the semiparametric results 
suggest th a t we need quadratic and cubic specifications to  capture the relation­
ship between firm productivity and MNE ownership. Hence, we construct two 
new variables:
Horizontal2 =  1 ( p  X SaleSit) s.t. 0 <  pi < 1 (22)
3 £ ( 1  SaleSit -  pi y J
Horizontal%t =  ^  X SaleSit) s.t. 0 <  pi < 1 (23)
SnlpS- ii=1 SaleSit
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These two variables - in combination with Horizontal  from (19) - should be able 
to  capture the intra-industry productivity effects in a parametric setup. Using 
these, we can also construct two additional variables to  parametrically proxy 
the quadratic relationship between downstream (upstream) MNE ownership and 
upstream (downstream) productivity:
B a ck w a r d j  =  ^ ^ ( a jk  X Horizontal^)  (24)
k=j
Forward^]- = ^ ^ /(v,ik X Horizontalkt ) (25)
j=k
5 .2  P a r a m e t r i c  r e s u l t s
Table 4 below specifies parametric regression models, including all three diffu­
sion variables, as well as the two control variables, while exploiting both the 
cross-section and the time variation of the data and splitting up the sample in 
high and low IPP  countries in columns (2) and (3). The standard errors are 
robust and have been allowed to  cluster at the industry level.
The results for the to tal sample in the parametric model are reported in 
column (1) and are rather different from the semiparametric results. Regarding 
the horizontal productivity effects, instead of a cubic relationship we actually 
observe a squared relationship. Specifically, there appear to  be decreasing re­
turns to  MNE ownership, as depicted in panel a of Figure 3:12 After an initial 
increase in intra-industry productivity effects following an increase in p, the 
relationship becomes negative around 30% of MNE ownership. Regarding the 
backward and forward effects, none of them  are significant.
< <  IN S E R T  T A B L E  4 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
We proceed by splitting up the sample in two groups: Those with a relatively 
high IPP  index and those with a relatively low IPP  index. We use the median 
IP P  level in the to tal sample as the cutoff point: This level is 4.19.13 Column
2 in Table 4 presents the result for the low-IPP sample. In contrast to  the 
to tal sample results in column (1), we now observe a cubic relationship between 
MNE ownership and intra-industry productivity effects. As shown in panel b 
of Figure 3, between 0%-20% of MNE ownership there is a positive relationship
12 All th e  panels in F igure 3 are constructed  w ith generic form ulas y  =  (ax  +  bx2 +  c x 3) ■ z,  
where y is producitivity , x is M NE ownership (betw een 0 and 100) and z is the  m ean value of 
e ither Hor izon ta l ,  B a ck w a rd  or F orw ard ,  com puted w ithout correcting for M NE ownership 
shares (these are 0.1, 0.01 and 0.03 respectively). T he coefficients a, b and (if applicable) c 
are th e  coefficient estim ates from Table 4.
1 3 Note th a t th is m edian value p e rta ins to  the  country-level ra th e r th an  the  industry  or 
firm-level, so th a t  th e  num ber of (firm-year) observations is not equally split betw een the  two 
groups. A dm ittedly, a m edian value of 4.19 is ra th e r high, which is caused by the  fact th a t 
we have m ainly high-developed countries in our sam ple. Also, it implies th a t the  variation 
in IP P  is m uch higer in the  low-IPP sam ple (from 2.9 to  4.19)) th an  in th e  h igh-IPP  sam ple 
(from 4.19 to  5).
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with intra-industry productivity effects, but this becomes negative after 20%. 
The subsequent decline in total productivity is larger than  in the to tal sample. 
The minimum in this relationship is beyond the relevant domain (0%-100%). 
As before, both the backward and forward effects are insignificant.
< <  IN S E R T  F IG U R E  3 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
Column (3) in the table repeats this model for the high-IPP countries. The 
horizontal productivity effects change back to  a quadratic form, with the turning 
point from a positive to  a negative relationship at 55% (panel c of Figure 3). 
We now also observe significant backward productivity effects, for which there 
appear to  be decreasing returns to  MNE ownership as well. As shown in panel 
d of Figure 3, the turning point of the relationship lies around 50%. Also note 
th a t the backward effect is similar in magnitude as the horizontal effect.
Both control variables are significant as in the semiparametric regressions. 
Firm size is consistently positive, indicating th a t larger firms are more pro­
ductive, and market share is consistently positive as well, indicating th a t large 
firm size relative to market size is generally also conducive to  firm productivity. 
Regarding model fit, all three models perform rather well with R 2s around 80%.
In Table 5 we repeat these regressions, now taking into account the condi­
tions derived in Table 1. Specifically, for all three regressions we interact the 
forward variable with a Herfindahl index. Additionally, in the low IPP  sample 
we interact the horizontal variable with our (F  +  L ) / L  variable. As mentioned 
before, the effect of a  on the backward variable is already included by construc­
tion.
Column (1) shows th a t the horizontal productivity effects are virtually simi­
lar as in column (1) of Table 4. However, we now also observe significant effects 
of our forward variable, interacted with the Herfindahl index. Panel a of Figure
4 shows the individual forward productivity effect: The relationship is positive 
up to  50% of MNE ownership and then becomes negative. Panel b depicts the 
interacted relationship, where we have taken the extreme case (i.e. a Herfindahl 
index of 1). As can be seen, the effects are almost reversed now, with a negative 
relationship up to  40% of MNE ownership.
< <  IN S E R T  T A B L E  5 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
In column (2) we also interact the horizontal variable with (F  +  L )/L . Both 
the individual and interacted effects are highly significant. Panel c in Figure 4 
shows the individual effects, which differ heavily from those in panel b of Figure 
3. In this case, the relationship is positive for MNE ownership below 30% and 
above 60%, and negative in between. In stark contrast, the interacted effects 
shown in panel d of Figure 4 demonstrate a consistently negative relationship 
between MNE ownership and intra-industry productivity .14 Regarding the 
forward effects, we now only observe a significant effect of the interaction terms. 
The effects are similar to  those in panel b of Figure 4, although the turning 
point now lies around 50%.
14T he variable (F  +  L ) f L  was evaluated a t its m ean of 14 when constructing  th e  graph.
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< <  IN S E R T  F IG U R E  4 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
Finally, column (3) repeats the model in column (1) for the high IPP  sample. 
In contrast to  Table 4, there now is a cubic relationship between MNE ownership 
and intra-industry productivity, shown in panel e of Figure 4. The relationship 
is now positive over the entire domain, with decreasing returns to  p up until 
70%, after which there are increasing returns. As before, backward productivity 
effects are significant, showing a similar pattern as in panel c of Figure 3. The 
individual forward productivity effect is now linear and positive, whereas the 
interaction effect shows a effect similar to  panel b in Figure 4, with the turning 
point at 20%.
As before, the control variables are both positive and significant throughout 
all the regressions, and with R 2s of around 80% the models perform well.
6 D iscu ssio n  and  co n clu sio n
In this paper we have theoretically and empirically investigated the relationship 
between horizontal and vertical productivity effects from MNEs with varying de­
grees of foreign ownership to  local (host-country) firms. Theoretically, we have 
established the ambiguity in this relationship due to  the simultaneous inter­
play of (sometimes) opposing knowledge diffusion, price and direct and indirect 
demand and supply linkage effects, and the mediating effect of intellectual prop­
erty right protection (IPP). We have also distinguished between unintentional 
knowledge spillovers and intentional knowledge transfers, where we argue the 
former mainly occur intra-industry, whereas the latter dominate inter-industry 
knowledge diffusion. Eventually we derived a number of conditions under which 
some of the ambiguous productivity effects are more likely to  be positive or 
negative.
We then empirically investigate the relationship between horizontal and ver­
tical MNE ownership in foreign aff liates and local firms’ productivity, using a 
panel of 1904 local firms and 327 MNEs in 20 countries and 18 industries during 
the period 2000-2005. We utilize both semiparametric partial linear regression 
analysis for exploratory purposes, as well as standard parametric panel data 
techniques.
Regarding horizontal (intra-industry) productivity effects, we initially find 
th a t there are decreasing returns to  MNE ownership. I.e. although productivity 
effects first increase with MNE ownership, a t some point the relationship be­
comes negative. From our theoretical model, we can derive th a t for low degrees 
of MNE ownership, the positive knowledge spillover and indirect upstream de­
mand linkages dominate, whereas for increased degrees of MNE ownership, the 
negative price effect and indirect downstream demand linkages dominate. One 
implication is th a t increased MNE ownership affects input and output shares 
asymmetrically: It appears th a t local input demand decreases faster with in­
creased MNE ownership than  local output supply, which may cause the shift 
from positive upstream to negative downstream linkages. Moreover, we observe
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th a t the relationship between firm productivity and MNE ownership occurs at 
higher degrees of MNE ownership in high-IPP systems relative to  low-IPP sys­
tems. This may be a reflection of the fact tha t MNE owners feel more secure in 
transferring knowledge upstream in high-IPP systems than  in low-IPP systems, 
as we already conjectured in our theoretical setup.
However, these results change quite a bit when we consider the interaction 
effect between our measure of horizontal foreign presence and the inverse share 
of variable costs in to tal costs of local firms. Our theoretical model predicts 
th a t in low-IPP systems, an increase in this inverse share should increase the 
likelihood of positive productivity effects. The reason for this is th a t the neg­
ative price effect in our model only works through marginal costs, whereas the 
positive knowledge spillover effect works both through fixed and marginal costs. 
However, our empirical results reach exactly the opposite conclusion: For higher 
inverse shares (indicating a larger share of fixed costs in to tal costs), the produc­
tivity effects from increased MNE ownership are actually negative, whereas for 
lower inverse shares they are largely positive. The implication is th a t positive 
knowledge spillover (and upstream indirect demand linkage) effects work more 
through marginal or variables costs than  through fixed costs. The fact tha t our 
model predicts exactly the opposite is due both to  an assumption (i.e. th a t 
both fixed and marginal costs are affected equally by knowledge spillovers and 
transfers) as well as the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition setup (which 
makes prices a function of marginal costs only). Our empirical results indicate 
th a t these modelling artifacts may be at odds with reality.
Regarding backward productivity effects, our theoretical model demonstrates 
opposing positive effects of upstream knowledge transfer, and negative effects of 
upstream price effects. Additionally, there is an ambiguous effect of backward 
linkages. We also find th a t a t least in high-IPP countries, an increase in the 
input share will increase the likelihood of a positive effect, as it serves to  make 
the backward linkages positive and hence tilt the balance in favor of the positive 
effects. Our empirical results are very consistent with this prediction. Indeed, 
in none of the total sample or low-IPP sample results do we find significant 
backward productivity effects, indicating the theoretical ambiguity. However, 
in the high-IPP samples we find a consistently significant effect. Moreover, we 
again find decreasing returns to  MNE ownership, with a positive relationship 
only for relatively low degrees of MNE ownership. If we link this result with the 
literature on international input sourcing by MNEs (Taveres and Young, 2006), 
this result is very consistent with our theoretical predictions: According to  this 
literature, increased MNE ownership increases the extent to  which a subsidiary 
sources its inputs internationally instead of locally, hence decreasing the (local) 
input share. According to  our model, this would eventually induce a negative re­
lationship between MNE ownership and backward productivity effects for larger 
degrees of MNE ownership, which is exactly what we observe.
Finally, our model indicates th a t in all cases, forward productivity effects 
will only take effect if there is a suff cient degree of downstream competition, the 
reason being th a t in th a t case positive forward linkages and knowledge transfer 
effects outweigh negative demand effects. Indeed, when we just consider for-
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ward productivity effects separately (i.e. without simultaneously considering 
downstream competition) we find no effects whatsoever. Only after interacting 
this effect with a Herfindahl index of downstream competition do we find consis­
tently significant effects. The positive relationship between MNE ownership and 
forward productivity effects in a highly competitive context is most pronounced 
in the high-IPP sample, where the effect is positive and linear. In the low-IPP 
sample there essentially is no effect in this case, whereas the relationship in 
the to tal sample is quadratic, reaching an optimum around 50%. These results 
are thus partly in accordance with our theory. Regarding the effects in low- 
competitive environments, we indeed find a negative relationship between MNE 
ownership and forward productivity effects for low degrees of MNE ownership. 
Nonetheless, for a large range of MNE ownership degrees, the relationship is 
positive, contrary to  what our model predicts. There are two possible expla­
nations for this: The first is th a t there exists a relationship between upstream 
MNE ownership and downstream competition, which we have not modelled, 
but which does not seem unlikely. Second, the derived conditions are suff cient 
conditions, but not necessary, so th a t the empirical results may be picking up 
something else.
So what does all of this imply for the effectiveness and usefulness of well- 
developed IPP  policy? One thing th a t both our model and our empirical results 
suggest, is th a t a strong IPP  system stimulates the intentional inter-industry 
transfer of knowledge from MNEs to  local firms, the extent of which depends 
on the amount of MNE ownership. Indeed, only in the high IPP  samples do 
we find significant and positive effects of backward productivity effects for low 
degrees of MNE ownership. Also for forward productivity effects, we find a 
positive relationship with MNE ownership in the high-IPP sample, given th a t 
downstream competition is sufficient. Even for horizontal productivity effects, 
we find an unconditional positive relationship with MNE ownership in high-IPP 
countries, which is again probably due to  the increased willingness of intentional 
inter-industry knowledge transfer, inducing positive indirect demand linkage 
effects (although we cannot separate these empirically). In sum, it seems th a t 
developing well-functioning IPP  regulations is only to  the benefit of the country 
involved: Even though firms (with a relatively large share of variable costs 
in to tal costs) in low-IPP countries may also benefit from positive horizontal 
productivity effects, the positive inter-industry effects are largely absent.
Finally, this study is characterized by some limitations, the most impor­
tan t of which is the fact th a t our sample only consists of large and publicly 
traded firms. As such, the results of this study cannot be readily general­
ized beyond the specific characteristics of our sample, and moreover, a direct 
comparison to  most of the earlier empirical one-country studies is not possible 
either. However, a trade-off exists between encompassing multiple countries in 
the analysis, versus increasing the firm-sample beyond only the largest firms, 
which inhibits investigating country-level effects on the knowledge spillover or 
transfer process. Another limitation is the fact th a t our sample mainly contains 
developed countries, which mainly translates into a limited variation on our IPP 
variable. Increasing the sample to  include also (large and traded) firms from less
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developed countries and emerging markets would be a valuable extension of this 
study, again specifically with regard to  investigating country-level determinants 
or moderators of the knowledge diffusion process.
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A p p e n d ix  A
Here we consider the case in which the I  J V  (and its local competitors) are active 
in the upstream industries, supplying other local firms in downstream industries. 
T hat is, we now consider part B  of Figure 1. This allows us to  investigate 
the direct effect of demand and supply effects and knowledge diffusion through 
forward linkages (rather than  indirectly, via backward linkages).
The analysis is very similar to  the one in the main text considering part A  
of Figure 1. The upstream industry price index is now given by:
P u =  (n up 1u~a +  n u v p j y  )1/ (1~j '>
As before, demand for intermediate products (which will be derived below) is 
denoted by I  so th a t applying Sheppard’s lemma yields demand for individual 
upstream firms’ products:
Xu =  PZa IPUj  
XIJV =  P u v  I P U
Profit functions for upstream firms are given by:
nu  =  PuXu -  (Ff  +  ß Sf Xu)w
n i j v  =  P u v  x i  j v  — (Fi j v  +  ß i j v  x i j v  )w
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In this case, the upstream firm benefits from MNE knowledge diffusion through 
spillovers rather than  transfers, since it is a direct competitor of the IJV. Sub­
stituting the individual demands and maximizing profits yields the equilibrium 
pricing conditions:
Pu =  
Pi j v  =
& ß u w
(a -  1)
a ß i j v u
(a  -  1)
In the downstream, the price index is given by:
Pd  =  (ndP1 f" ) 1/(1^ £)
As before, to tal demand for downstream products is denoted by Y P d v so th a t 
we can derive demand for individual downstream products:
Xd =  Pd£Yp£D n 
Downstream firm profits are expressed as:
nd =  PdXd -  (f t  +  ß Td Xd)(^Pu +  (1 -  m)u)
where ^  is the share of inputs th a t the downstream firm obtains from the 
upstream firms. Again note th a t in this case, the downstream firm benefits 
from knowledge diffusion through knowledge transfer rather than  knowledge 
spillovers. Substituting demand into the profit function we can once more de­
rive profit maximizing equilibrium prices:
Pd = "ß d (Mp u +  (1 -  M)u) 
(" -  1)
We can now also write down an explicit function for derived demand for 
intermediate inputs:
I  =  ^nd ( f T  +  ßT Xd)
A p p e n d ix  B
B 1  I J V s  i n  t h e  d o w n s t r e a m  s e c t o r  -  dU.u/ d p
First consider the elements of d n u/dp:
28
B L 1 = (^ ------ + (1 _  0)^ S  )(Fm _  Fn) + (TT7,------- + (1 — ° ) ~ ^ S  )(ßm _  ß n)
oFi j v d F f J ydß i j v ' d ß f>
indirect knowledge spillover <0
@Pi j v  (ß _ R ) +  @Pijv @p u dPu 0(ß _ ß )
(ßm ß n) +  /^-,T 0(ßm ß n)
d I  Qx i j v  
d x i j v  d'Puv dß i j v dPu dPu dßi
downstream demand linkage >0
d I  d x d 
dxd @Pd d ß f dPu dPu dß
downstream demand linkage >0
(
d I  d x i j v  d I  dxd \  
+  k@x i j v  @Pd +  dxd @Pd )
+
\
9Pn
@Pd
dPn 
dp ijv
(1 -  0)(ßm -  ßn)
i @Pd dPu @Pu o( a _  ß )
+  dPu dpu dßl ü(Pm ß n )
" dpiJV (ß _  ß )
@ßIJV (ßm ß n)
i dPlJV dPu @Pu o( ß _  ß ) 
_ +  8 Pu dpu dßl ü(ßm ß n)
P E i =
d ow n s t r e a m p r ic e e ffec t < 0
d xu  dPu dPu
dPu dPu dß  J^ (ßm -  ß n)
K T i = - U 9  [(Fm -  Fu) +  Xu(ßm ~  ßn)]
Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms 
yields the following expression for d n u/dp:
d nu
dp
u ß l Xu a  ( n i j v  +  (1 -  9)nd) — u 9 (Fm -  Fn)
Te r m 1
U ß l  Xu J  +  ß l  (A 1 +  A2) 0 .PTua+PUe0, w +  i f  (1 -  0) 
+ a ( n i j v x i v  +  (1 -  0 )ndXd) +  -Ä (ßm -  ß n)
Term 2
where
Ai =  ( n i j v ß i j v x i j v  +  ndßf X d ) n i j v (e — r)  ^ ~  " ( n i j v P i j v x i j v )
A2 =  ( n i j v  Pi j v  x i j v  +  ndßf  Xd)nd(e -  r)  y  p d j  -  e(ndßf  Xd)
In order to  sign the derivative, note th a t the first term  in Term 1 is positive and 
the second negative, so th a t Term 1 has an ambiguous sign. It can be shown
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th a t A1 <  0 as follows:
Ai <  0 o  X n i j v  (e — r )  ^  < e ( n i j v  Pi j v  x i j v  )
— r  < n i j v  ß  i j v  x i j v  Pdl —£
e X n i j v P 1Jv
n i j v ß i j v p u v y Pd ' Pd 
X n i j v  p i j v  
Pi j v Y P , '  _  ß i j v YP,
X p i j v  p i j v  ( n i j v  Pi j v  x i j v  +  ndßf  Xd)
____________ Pi j v  Y P¿~ ' _____________
Pi j v  Y p j ^ v (ni j v  ß  i j v Pi Jdv +  n dß f  Pd") 
 ß i j v PD "  
Pi j v  (nu v  ß i j v  Pi j v  +  n dß f  Pd")
= 1
since p i j v  =  (Pi j v / ß f )Pd. Since e > r,  this condition will always hold, and 
similarly for A2. Moreover, this also implies th a t A ' +  A2 <  0. Indeed, we have 
that:
Ai +  A2 =  - r (ni j v ß i j v x IJv  +  n dß f X d) < 0 
Note th a t we can rewrite Term 2 as follows:
' J  +  *  ( A  +  A2) .p u + ^ f a).  +  (1 -  0)
+ a ( n i j v x i v  +  (1 -  0 )ndXd) +  ß l
ü(Ai +  n i j v ß i j v x i j v ) +  0  [a2 (Ai +  A2) Pu  +  I  (aPu +  (1 _  a ) u ) ]
ß i j v  ß u (aPu  +  (1 — a)w)
<0
a  ( A2 +  ndßf  Xd)
+(1  -  0 )— ------ ^s-------- L
ß d
<0
where the sign of the first and last term  follow from the fact tha t Ai, A2 <  0.15 
The sign of the second term  is ambiguous however. We can derive a condition 
under which this term  (and hence the entire Term 2) is negative, which obviously 
is the case if the numerator is negative:
[a2 (Ai +  A2) Pu  +  I  (aPu  +  (1 — a )u )j
=  a  ^ (n i Jv  Pi j v  x i j v  +  ndßf  Xd) [a(1 -  r)Pu  +  (1 -  a )u ] . <  0 
+  (aP u  +  (1 — a ) u ) ( n u v  F i j v  +  ndFf  )
15 Note th a t the  condition in th is case changes to  (£ — T¡)¡(£ — 1) <  1 which still holds since 
> r¡ > 1.
I
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For this condition to  hold it is necessary to  have:
( n i j y ß j j v x j v  +  Udßd Xd) <  _  a (1 -  r ) P j  +  (1 -  a) w
( n u v  F i j v  +  UdFd  ) aPjj  +  (1 — a)w
dHu/dp  if  8  =  1
If 8  =  1, Term 1 reduces to  —w(Fm — Fn ) >  0. Hence, a sufficient condition for 
dHu/dp > 0 then is:
( n i j v  P i j v  x i j v  +  Udßd Xd ) a ( 1  -  r )Pu  +  (1 -  a)w
( n i j v  F i j v  +  UdFddd )
<  —
aPjj  +  (1 — a)w
dHu/dp  if  8  =  0
If 8  =  0, Term 1 is unambiguously positive and Term 2 unambiguously negative.
(u i j v  +  nd)
dHu
dp
awß'u Xu 
a — 1
-(Fm -  Fn)
<0
+ A l  +  n i j v ß iJV XiJV A2 +  n dß d Xd
ß iJV ß dd
(ßm -  ß n)
>0
There is no concise sufficient or necessary condition which ensures d n u/dp  is 
either positive or negative in this case.
B 2  I J V s  i n  t h e  d o w n s t r e a m  s e c t o r  -  d n d/ d p
The elements of dRd/dp  are:
_  ß'dd(aPu  +  (1 -  a)w) -Xd 
P  E 2 =  ---
dPp
@Pd
+
he -  1) dPD
[(1 -  8 )(ßm -  ßd)] +  @@Pd [ H f  8 (ßm -  ßd)
dPn
dpu
@PIJ
dßi :(ßm -  ßd) + [dppudßf 8 (ßm -  ßd) 
K S i  = - ( a P u  +  (1 -  a)w)(1 -  8) [(Fm -  Fd) +  Xd(ßm -  ßn)]
S . öS \ - P u  -PuI D L i = ~ a(Fd +  ß d Xd)
-Pu dßl 8(ßm -  ß d)
Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms 
yields the following expression for dHd/dp:
d p  =  (e _  r ) rp"rXdPD_i [P T n dA 3 +  p U v UiJV A4] (ßm ~  ß n)
— ( a P j  +  (1 -  a)w)(1 -  8) [(Fm -  Fd) +  Xd (ßm -  ßn)]
~ a(Fd +  ß S Xd) ß T 8(ßm ~  ß n) 
ß u
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A3 =  PS  (1 -  9) +  a ß  S 0- " r  w  Pd e 1 ß
with
u
. _  PiJV n  as . aSa e PU A 4  =  — (1 — d) +  a ß d 9  -  —r
PiJV e -  1 ß u
Signing this derivate is not straightforward. Therefore, we consider its sign 
under 9 =  1 and 9 = 0 .
dDu/dp  if  9 =  1
If 9 =  1, dnd/dp reduces to:
d n d _  PU < 0  ¡o \
T a 0T (ßm ß n)dp ß 1
=  a pT (ßm ß n)
ß u
(e — r)
Pdx dp D~ißS  £ _  1 [Pd£nd +  p7jV ui j v ] -  (FdS +  ßdSx d)
ß d x d^ypdPD £ _  1 [pd n d +  pIJVn i JV] _  1 ^  _  F ,d
Note th a t a sufficient condition for dDd/dp to  be positive is thus: 
(£ _  r)
PdpFD 1 1 [Pd"n d +  P7jv UiJv ] <  1
<  pip £
-  1 Pd [pd "n d +  PlJivn iJV]
-  r  < [pdr£nd +  p ' j ^ n i jv ]
£ -  1 [pd "n d +  Pd Pi JV n iJv]
Given th a t e > r  > 1 the LHS of this condition <  1. Hence, if the RHS — 1 the 
condition is always met. It can be shown th a t RHS >  1 by noting th a t we in 
this case we need th a t pd >  Pi j v  :
Pd > PiJV
¿  ^ eßS (aPu  +  (1 — a)w) ^  eßiJV (aPu  +  (1 — a)w)
ßS  >  ß iJV
9ßd +  (1 _  9)ß iJV >  ß iJV 
ß d = ß n > ß iJV (since 9  =  1) 
ß n > Pß m +  (1 -  P)ßn
Since we have assumed th a t ß m < ß n this condition is always met for for all 
P 2  [0 ; 1].
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dDu/dp  if  9 =  0
If 9 =  0, dDd/dp reduces to:
=  (e -  r)  ^  x p D
n dPid + n iJVpIJV (ßm -  ß n)
ßS ß iJV
- ( a P u  +  (1 -  a)w) [(Fm -  Fd) +  Xd(ßm -  ßn)]
¡ \ pd p £ -i (£ -  r ) —  Pd n dPd
ß S
+ n iJVpIJV
d ß iJV
- ( a P u  +  (1 -  a)w)(Fm -  Fd)
-  ( a p u  +  (1 -  a)w) f x d(ßm -  ß n)
¡ \ pd p £ -i (£ -  r ) — Pd n dp d +  n iJVp IJV
ß ßSd ß iJV
- ( a P u  +  (1 -  a)w)(Fm -  Fd)
-  (£ -  1)-PdS \ Xd(ßm -  ß n) 
£ß d
Note th a t a sufficient condition for dDd/dp >  0 is:
(£ -  r) n d pd
ßS
+ n iJVp!JV
(£ -  1)
If ß S =  ß i j v  this condition reduces to:
(£ -  r)
ß iJV
<
p D
ßS
(£ -  1)
n dpd V +  n i j v p 1jV
ßS
(£ -  r ) 
(£ -  1)
pDl V
ß S
(£ -  r) 
(£ -  1)
<
<
P;D
ßS
p i_ß D
ßS
< 1
which as we saw above is always the case. Given th a t ß S =  9ßd +  (1 — 9)ß j v  
and the fact th a t 9 =  0, we indeed have th a t ß S =  ß i j v  so th a t this condition 
always holds.
B 3  I J V s  i n  u p s t r e a m  s e c t o r  -  dU.u / d p  
First consider the elements of d n u/dp:
1DL2 =  9 ^  t (  (Fm -  Fd) +  (ßm -  ßd ))
PE3  =
w ß u dxu
(ßm -  ß d)
@Pt  dpu
iS
(1 -  9) +
d ß u  d p i j v
(a -  1) d P u ^ m r d  V dpu d ß S ^  ” ’ ' d p i j v  d ß U v  
K S 2  =  w (1 -  9) [(Fm -  Fd) +  xu(ßm -  ßn)]
l -
l
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Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms 
yields the following expression for d n u/dp:
dDu
dp =  9 Mn d —  [(Fm -  F n) +  x d(ßm ~  ß n)]a 1
aw
+x upuPu (ßm ß n)nj a  — 1
- w(1 -  9) [(Fm -  Fd) +  x u(ßm -  ß n)] 
The elements of dDd/dp are:
(n uPu a +  n iJV Puav)
ß E  Pd d x d dPD ( p p )
P E 4  =  I - dPD ~dPd -
@Pd
+  @Pd ( @Pu @Pu (1 _  9) +  dPu dpiJV \  
+  dPu \  dpu dßU ( ) +  dpiJV @ß i jv J^ > ijv d IJV ^
K T 2  =  - 9 ( ^ P u  +  (1 -  m)w) [(Fm -  Fd) +  xd(ßm -  ßn)]
F  Li  =  ( ß Td xd +  F T )  ((1
dpu d ß S ' d p i j v  d ß i j v  /
Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms 
yields the following expression for dDd/dp:
^  =  xd (ß _  ß  )
dp £ (ßm ßn)
I pd
ßT
+ P u (Vß) UW ((1 -  9)uuPua +  U i j v p J ) J
~ 9 (JJ,p U +  (1 -  M)w) [(Fm -  Fd) +  xd(ßm -  ß n)]
-M (ßT x d +  f T )  (ßm -  ß n )PU a ~ ~ [ ( ( 1  ~  9 )nuPÜU +  Ui JV PjjjV)
It is clear th a t the firs two lines of this expression are positive, while the 
third line is negative.
dDu/dp  if  9 =  1
If 9 =  1 dDu/dp  reduces to:
dDu
dp =  Mn d P  Y  [(Fm -  F n) +  x d(ßm ~  ß n)]
+ x uPuPU i (ß m -  ß n)—w  (n uPuU +  n i J V P u v )nJ a  -  1
which is clearly negative. Hence if 9 =  1, dDu/dp < 0.
dDu/dp  if  9 =  0 
If 9 =  0 dDu/dp  reduces to: 
dDu
dp =  x uPuP j  i (ß m -  ß  n) (n uPu a +  n iJV p j v )
~ w [(Fm -  Fd) +  x u(ßm -  ß n)]
T
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Hence, a sufficient and necessary condition to  have th a t dHu/dp > 0 in this case 
is that:
puP u a — 1 (nu pu V +  n u y  p j j y )  <
a (n uPu V +  n iJVPuPuy) <
[(Fm Fd) +  x u(ßm ß n)\ 
x u(ßm ~  ß n)
[(Fm ~  Fd) +  x u(ßm ~  ß n)\
a  1 (n upu +  n IJV pIJV) x u(ßm ß n )
Given th a t 9 = 0  we have th a t ß i j v  =  ß t  and hence th a t pu =  p i j v  i.e:
[(Fm _  Fd) +  x u(ßm ~  ß n)]
a 1 < x u(ßm ß n)
Hence, the larger fixed costs relative to  marginal costs (or more precisely: The 
more im portant the effect of knowledge diffusion on fixed rather than  marginal 
costs), the more likely this condition is to  hold, and hence, the more likely it is 
th a t dHu/dp > 0
B 4  I J V s  i n  t h e  u p s t r e a m  s e c t o r  -  dU.d/ d p
The elements of dHd/dp are:
P E 4 = £ß'T (^Pu +  (1 -  m)w) dxd dPD
(£ -  1) @Pd dpd
dpT9(ßm -  ßn)
+  dPd ( dPu dPu (1 _  9) +  dPu dPlJv \  (p _  p ) 
+  dPu  ^dpu dßU (1 9  +  dpjjv d ß u v )  (Pm p n)
K T 2  =  - 9 ( ^ P u  +  (1 -  p)w) [(Fm -  Fd) +  xd(ßm -  ßn)]
F  Li  =  PTd xd +  F d )  ( (^1 dPU dPu +  dPU dPiJV j (P _ P ) 
dpu d ß S +  d p i j v  dß IJV ' (Pm Pu)
Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms 
yields the following expression for dHd/dp:
dH^ =  -  (Pm -  Pn)dp £
) Pd
+ p v " ß d ) VVw((1 -  9)nup-u V +  n i J V P ^ V ) ,
~ 9 (HP U +  (1 -  M)w) [(Fm -  Fd) +  x d(ßm -  ß n)] 
-M (ßT x d +  FJ^J (ßm -  ß  n)PV a aW1 ((1 -  9 )n uPuV +  n iJV P u v  )
Clearly, the term  in the first line is negative whereas the terms in the second 
and third lines are positive. From the analyses below it follows th a t £ >  2 is a 
sufficient condition for dHu/dp  to  be positive.
V — l
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dHu/dp  if  9 =  1
If 9 =  1 dHd/dp  reduces to:
dHd
dp
Pd
ßl
+PU"rk)  V W (nuPuV +  n iJVPu v )
— (MP U +  (1 -  M)w) [(Fm -  Fd) +  x d(ßm -  ß n)]
-M {ß 1  x d +  F d )  (ßm -  ß n)PU a~W[ (nuPña' +  n iJVP:[Vv )
—  (ßm -  ß n) - T -  £(MPU +  (1 -  M)w)
ß d
+ mPU a  _  1 (nupu U +  n iJVpI VV)(ßm _  ß n)
x dß d -  ( ß Txd +  F j )
(£ -  1)
- ( mP u +  (1 -  M)w ) ( F m ~  Fd)
—  (ßm -  ß n)
Pd( 2  -  £)
ß j
+Mß U 0 ~ [ (nuPua +  n iJV P j v  )(ßm -  ß n)
x dß d (2 _  £) f T 
(£ -  1) “  Fd
Hence, a sufficient condition for dHd/dp > 0 when 9 =  1 is £ >  2.
dHu/dp  if  9 =  0
If 9 =  0 dHd /dp  reduces to:
d pd  =  MPV 0 ~ [ (nuPua +  n iJV P u v  )(ß m -  ß  n) '
x dß d (2 — £) FT
- ¡ T T Ï )  Fd
Hence, a sufficient condition for dHd/dp > 0 when 9 =  0 is £ >  2.
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Table 1: Signs of the total derivatives
o <  e <  i 0 = 0 e  = 1
MNEs downstream 
MNEs upstream
dn„
d p
dUd
d p
d U u
d p
dUd
d p
^ 0
^ 0
^ 0
> 0 if e >  2
^ 0  
>  0
0 if a ^ F d )  +  X u { ß m — ß n ) ]
> U  11 < 7 - 1  ^  X u ( ß m - ß n )
> 0 if e >  2
>  0 if
( n i j v ß i j v x i J V + n d ß d X d ) ^  a ( l - T i ) P u  +  ( l ~ a ) w  
( n i  j v  F i  j v + r i d F ¡ ¡  ) ^ a P u  +  (  l  — a ) v j
> 0 
<  0
>  0 if e >  2
Table 2: Pairwise correlations
1 2 3 4 6 7
1. Productivity
2. Horizontal 0.15
3. Backward 0.16 0.16
4. Forward 0.17 0.39 0.22
6 . (Log) Size 0.17 -0.04 0.08 -0.00
7. Market share 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.52
Mean 5.03 4.40 0.50 1.46 12.8 0.07
St. Dev. 1.88 8.66 0.77 3.65 1.87 0.14
Table 3: Semiparametric model esimates
(1) Horizontal (2) Backward (3) Forward
0.124*** 0.163*** 0.162***
(log) Size (.042) (.025) (.023)
Market Share 0.634*
0.387** 0.280*
(.397) (.160) (.156)
V 2.85*** 2.61*** 2.67***
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.29 0.53 0.52
N 1,195 2, 462 2, 462
D ependent variable is log of firm productivity . Notes: (a) * p< 0 .1 ; ** p<0.05; 
*** p<0.01 (b) E stim a to r based on Lokshin (2006) w ith ls t-o rd e r differencing
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Table 4: Parametric model esimates
(1) Total Sample (2) Low IPP (3) High IPP
Horizontal 0.047**
0 .100* 0.057**
(.017) (.053) (.022)
Horizontal Squared - 0 .001** -0.004** - 0.001**(.001) (.002) (.001)
Horizontal Cubed (x 100) 0.000 0 .002** 0.000(.000) (.001) (.000)
Backward 0.168
0.014 0.420**
(.146) (.340) (.203)
Backward Squared -0.003
0.001 -0.008***
(.002) (.004) (.003)
Forward 0.004 -0.087 0.100(.073) (.058) (.220)
Forward Squared 0.000 0.001 - 0.002(.001) (.001) (.004)
(log) Size 0.205***
0.183** 0.206***
(.050) (.076) (.046)
Market Share 0.847***
1.24** 0.785**
(.265) (.492) (.359)
Constant 0.138 -1 .60
2 74***
(.643) (.847) (.574)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.79 0.78 0.79
N 6,579 1,855 4,724
D ependent variable is log of firm productivity . Notes: (a) * p< 0 .1 ; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
(b) R obust s tan d ard  errors w ith industry-level clustering (c) Low IP P  <  4.19 on G inarte  and 
Park  (1996) index
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Table 5: Parametric model esimates - Interactions
(1) Total Sample (2) Low IPP (3) High IPP
Horizontal 0.046**(.018)
0.145**
(:062)
0.061**
(:020)
Horizontal x [(F +  L)/L] -
-0.014***
(:004) -
Horizontal Squared
- 0 .001*
(.001)
-0.004**
(:002)
- 0 .001***
(:000)
Horizontal Squared x [(F +  L)/L] -
0.0004***
(.0001) -
Horizontal Cubed (x 100) 0.000(.000)
0.003**
(.001)
0:0006*
(:0003)
Horizontal Cubed x [(F +  L)/L] -0.0003***
( x 100) (.0001)
Backward 0.147
(.147)
-0.183
(:375)
0.437**
(.192)
Backward Squared
-0.003
(.002)
0 .011*
(:006)
-0.009***
(:003)
Forward 0.189*
(.102)
0:274
(:255)
0.466*
(:263)
Forward x Herfindahl -0.550***(.146)
-1.15**
(:506)
-1.05***
(:326)
Forward Squared - 0 .002*(.001)
-0 .003
(:003)
-0.008
(:005)
Forward Squared x Herfindahl 0.007***(.002)
0.013**
(:006)
0.016**
(:006)
(log) Size 0.196***(.050)
0.147**
(:069)
0:195***
(:044)
Market Share
1.03***
(.287)
1:92***
(:567)
1.00**
(:345)
Constant 0.208 -1 .0 4
2:92***
(.654) (1:45) (:584)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.79 0.80 0.79
N 6,579 1,404 4,724
D ependent variable is log of firm productivity . Notes: (a) * p< 0 .1 ; ** p<0.05; *** p< 0.01 (b) R obust 
s tan d ard  errors w ith industry-level clustering (c) Low IP P  <  4.19 on G inarte  and Park  (1997) index
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Table A1: Sample countries and industries
C o u n trie s In d u s tr ie s
Australia Mining of coal
Austria Mining of metal ores
Belgium Food products and beverages
Canada Textiles
Denmark Wood and wood products
Finland Paper and paper products
France Coke, petroleum and fuel
Germany Chemicals and chemical products
Hong Kong Rubber and plastic products
Israel Other non-metallic and mineral products
Italy Basic metals
Japan Fabricated metal products
South Korea Machinery and equipment
Netherlands Electrical machinery and apparatus
Singapore Medical, precision and optical instruments
Spain Motor vehicles
Sweden Furniture
Switzerland Construction
United Kingdom
United States
41
Figure 1: Schematic representation of horizontal and vertical linkages
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aMNE Ow nership (%) 
b
MNE Ow nership (%)
c
MNE Ow nership (%)
Figure 2: Semiparametric relationship between firm productivity and MNE own­
ership
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c: H o rizontal - High IPP d: B ackw ard  - High IPP
a: H o rizontal - Total S am p le b: H o rizontal - L o w  IPP
M NE O w n e rs h ip  (%)
M NE O w n e rs  hip (%) MNE O w n e rs  hip (%)
M NE O w n e rs  hip (%)
Figure 3: Parametric relationship between firm productivity and MNE ownership
a: Forward (individual effect) - Total sample
d: Horizontal (interaction  effect) - Lo w  IPP e: Horizontal - High IPP
30 40 50 60 70 
MNE Ownership (%)
Figure 4: Parametric relationship between firm productivity and MNE ownership: Interaction effects
